Strategic Decisions in Pricing with Warranty, Bundling, and Investment

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Graduate Institute of Industrial Management > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/91815

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/91815

Title:	Strategic Decisions in Pricing with Warranty, Bundling, and Investment
Authors:	普碧塔;Andriani, Debrina Puspita
Contributors:	工業管理研究所
Keywords:	協調機制;客戶偏好;定價決策;延保;博弈論;投資策略;權力結構;coordination mechanism;customer preferences;pricing decision;extended warranty;game theory;investment strategy;power structure
Date:	2023-07-14
Issue Date:	2024-09-19 14:14:39 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	本研究通過考慮兩個製造商為競爭市場與雙頭壟斷的權力結構下，考慮保固期、捆綁銷售和投資策略來決定定價決策。首先，我們調查了保固期和捆綁銷售策略對雙壟斷市場中使用空間競爭的定價模型的聯合影響。透過建構納許均衡模型，我們開發了純捆綁銷售和混合捆綁銷售兩種情境，以確定製造商的最優決策。在純捆綁銷情境中，兩個製造商提供捆綁基本保修。而在混合捆綁方案中，兩者都提供捆綁的基本保修，但其中一個通過提供非捆綁銷售的延長保固期來增強其服務。其次，我們分析了品質、保固期與投資的相互作用，假設在權力結構下製造商和零售商的兩級供應鏈中存在兩種不同的客戶需求。製造商投資於特定的質量水平以生產優質產品。同時，零售商投資提供延長保修服務作為售後服務。使用博弈理論開發了三種決策分析模型，分別為集中式、製造商主導的分散式和零售商主導的分散式模型。此外，我們提出考慮權力結構的批發價格合同，讓供應鏈有效協調並實現雙贏。最後，數值分析和敏感度分析證實了理論分析結果並提供了管理見解。;This study analyzes pricing decisions concerning warranty, bundling, and investment strategies in two competitive markets, a duopoly and a two-echelon supply chain under a power structure. Firstly, we examine the joint impact of the warranty and bundling strategies on pricing decisions considering the spatial competition in a duopolistic market. By constructing a Nash equilibrium model, we propose two scenarios to determine the optimal manufacturer’s strategic decisions: pure and mixed bundling scenarios. In the pure bundling scenario, two manufacturers offer a bundled base warranty. Meanwhile, in the mixed bundling scenario, both manufacturers provide a bundled base warranty, but one upgrades its service by additionally offering an unbundled extended warranty. Secondly, we analyze the interplay of quality and warranty investments, assuming two heterogeneous customer demands exist in a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer under power structures. A manufacturer invests in a specific quality level to produce a quality product. Meanwhile, a retailer invests in the extended warranty service provision as an after-sales service. Three analytical decision-making models are developed using the game theory: centralized, manufacturer-led decentralized, and retailer-led decentralized models. Further-more, we propose wholesale price contracts considering power structures to coordinate effectively and achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical and sensitivity analyzes confirm the analytical results and yield managerial insights.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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