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    题名: 考慮競爭環境及政府補貼之最佳化封閉式供應鏈模型;Optimization Modeling of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with the Considerations of Competitors and Government Subsidies
    作者: 陳婉婷;Chen, Wan-Ting
    贡献者: 工業管理研究所
    关键词: 電子業;逆物流;第三方物流;再製造;Stackelberg 模型;Electronics Industry;Reverse Logistics;Third-party Logistics;Remanufacturing;Stackelberg Model
    日期: 2020-07-14
    上传时间: 2020-09-02 14:57:18 (UTC+8)
    出版者: 國立中央大學
    摘要: 面對現今環保意識抬頭,再加上電子廢棄物數量的快速成長,政府制定了相關政策,以提高回收量,達到資源永續利用的目標。而本研究之目的在於比較政府實施回收補貼前後,對回收量與製造商利潤的影響,以達到製造商利潤最大化。本研究參考Weng and Chen(2016)之架構,且將競爭係數納入考量,探討回收商在競爭環境之下對供應鏈帶來的影響。以製造商、第三方回收商及零售商所組成的封閉式供應鏈,在Stackelberg模型架構下,包含領導者與跟隨者兩種角色,製造商為領導者,第三方回收商及零售商為跟隨者。此外,由製造商進行再製造,第三方及零售商負責回收的工作,產品則交由零售商販賣給消費者。研究結果發現,在回收商競爭環境下,當政府對第三方與零售商進行補貼時,兩者回收廢品的價格與回收量皆為增加,也帶動製造商利潤的上升。因此,政府補貼回收業者,不僅有利於供應鏈系統的各個成員,同時也造福消費者,實現了社會利潤的最大化。而根據敏感度分析之結果,提供兩種情境在回收量與製造商利潤的表現,以便政府制定有益於供應鏈整體之政策。;Nowadays, the increase of environmental awareness has risen and the volume of E-waste produced has been growing rapidly. Thus, government have formulated relevant policies to improve the amount of recycling and achieve the goal of sustainable use of resources. The purpose of study is to compare whether the government has provided recycling subsidies, the impact on the amount of recycling and the manufacturer′s profit in order to maximize the manufacturer′s profit. The study refers to the structure of Weng and Chen (2016), taking the competition coefficient into consideration, discussing the effect of recyclers on the supply chain under the competitive environment. A closed-loop supply chain that includes a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party company. There are two roles including leader and follower in the Stackelberg model. The manufacturer is the leader, the retailer and third-party are followers. In addition to, the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing, the third party and the retailer in charge of recycling, and the retailer sells products to the consumers. The results of study show that when under the competitive environment of recyclers, the government provides subsidies to the third-party and the retailer, prices for recycled materials and amounts of recycling have increased, which has also increased the manufacturers’ profits. Therefore, the government provides subsidies to recyclers, which not only benefits all members of the supply chain, but also benefits consumers. In other words, it maximizes social profits. Based on the results of the sensitivity analysis, they provide the performance of the two scenarios in terms of recycling amounts and manufacturers’ profits, so that the government can formulate policies that are beneficial to the overall supply chain.
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