本研究在二階層通路結構中，以Padmanabhan and Png（1997）的退貨方式作為背景，並劃分大小型的零售商相互競爭的結構，探討當兩者不同類型的零售商雙通路競爭下，整體市場需求與價格都有相互牽制影響，其中以Stackelberg 賽局理論之單期模型，兩者間領導者（製造商）與追隨者（零售商）之層級關係時，分析最佳的決策變數後，得到兩種均衡的最佳批發價、訂購量與零售價格，製造商最後決策實施無退貨或全額退貨政策，以本身利潤改善為決策考量。本研究是以製造商的最大利潤為目的，採取上述不同決策所產生的結果，結果說明當製造商實施全額退貨政策會顯著改善製造商利潤，並有助於整體通路利潤。 ;Return policy has become closely linked with production and marketing process in particular that it has a major effect in supply chains that are highly competitive. In addition, not only that return policy is an approach to share the risk of inventory for manufacturers and retailers, return policy also makes them achieve production-marketing coordination.
The paper models a two-echelon supply chain which consists of one manufacturer and two competitive retailers, where one of the retailers is dominant. The work of Padmanbhan and Png (1997) highlights the return policy that is applied in manufacturer-retailer channels.
In this study, two policies are offered by the manufacturer, the no return and the full return policies in order to explore the wholesale price, the order quantity and the retail price under the heterogeneous retailers’ competitive channel.
This study adopts the game-theoretic model to determine the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader and two retailers as Followers.
This study is to investigate whether return policy will change the manufacturer’s strategy. Computation results illustrate that the manufacturer can obtain more profits by adopting a full return policy. Therefore, by providing a full return policy, the manufacturer can make an obvious improvement on its marketing efficiency.
