決定香菇太空包逆向供應鏈之汙染費與補貼; Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in “shiitake growth bag” reverse supply chains

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Title:	決定香菇太空包逆向供應鏈之汙染費與補貼;Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in “shiitake growth bag” reverse supply chains
Authors:	魏稜;Wei,Leng
Contributors:	工業管理研究所
Keywords:	香菇太空包;逆物流;Stcakelberg模型;汙染費;補貼;shiitake growth bag;reverse logistics;Stackelberg-type model;recycling fees;subsidies
Date:	2013-07-01
Issue Date:	2013-08-22 11:38:32 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	台中市新社區是台灣香菇生產的重要產地，近年來新社區的香菇產量佔了全台香菇產量將近五成，經本研究探討現況後發現每年種植香菇後的太空包產生了大量的廢棄物，這些廢棄物若是沒有適當處理就隨意丟棄、掩埋的話，對於當地與鄰近地區會引發嚴重的環境汙染。可能的問題是：菇農在生產完成後將太空包廢棄物隨意丟棄、掩埋，或是回收商雖然接收了太空包廢棄物但是沒有適當處理。本研究主要參考Hong and Ke(2011)的研究，在探討了香菇產業與太空包製造、使用、回收現況並考慮各個角色之買賣關係後，提出一個四階段的模型，在本研究提出的模型之情境中，太空包供應商製造太空包賣給菇農，因此太空包供應商必須要延長生產者責任，所以基管會會向太空包供應商收取汙染費；而菇農使用太空包栽培了香菇後再販售予消費者；回收部分由太空包回收商付予菇農回收獎勵金，以此鼓勵菇農願意將太空包交由回收商回收而不是自行隨意處理，太空包回收商將會從基管會收到補貼費，這樣可以鼓勵太空包回收商願意確實地做適當處理，並確保回收商在回收太空包的部分能有利可圖，避免因市場上回收塑膠與木屑的價格不穩定而將廢棄太空包隨意處理。研究結果顯示，太空包成品的最大需求量與敏感係數變動會影響到污染費，回收商的回收處理成本以及廢棄物賣給後續處理商的價格(P_k)變動則會影響到補貼費，而汙染費上升則太空包成品生產量下降，補貼費上升則廢棄太空包回收數量上升，因此基管會可透過控制汙染費與補貼費，達到抑制香菇太空包的數量以及鼓勵菇農與回收商回收廢棄太空包的目的。 Xinshe District, Taichung City, Taiwan, is an important source of shiitake production. In recent years, shiitake production of Xinshe District accounted for almost half of shiitake production of Taiwan. Those used shiitake growth bags will be large amounts of waste. If the waste were not managed properly, it could cause serious pollution. This research mainly appealed to Hong & Ke’s “Determining Advanced Recycling Fees and subsidies in “E-scrap” Reverse Supply Chains.” After exploring the shiitake industry with the shiitake growth bag’s manufacture, use, recycling of the current situation, and considering trading relationship between roles, we present a four-stage Stackelberg-type model. There are five roles in the model including Environmental Protection Administration (EPA), the manufacturer of shiitake growth bag, the shiitake farmer, the consumer and the recycler. Each independent role determines advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and socially optimal subsidy fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. To develop an optimal economic policy, EPA makes the ARFs and subsidies while the others make the optimal selling quantity and pricing in the market. In the same time, they make the optimal reward for customers and recycling quantity too. The results show that by controlling ARFs and subsidy fees, EPA can inhibit the number of manufacturing shiitake growth bags and to encourage the shiitake farmer and the recycler to recycle used shiitake growth bags.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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