中大機構典藏-NCU Institutional Repository-提供博碩士論文、考古題、期刊論文、研究計畫等下載:Item 987654321/53209
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 80990/80990 (100%)
Visitors : 41959182      Online Users : 1004
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/53209


    Title: 逆物流下單一製造商與雙壟斷市場之最佳回收次數;Optimal recycle number under a monopoly、duopoly in a green supply chain
    Authors: 徐培容;Pei-Jung Hsu
    Contributors: 工業管理研究所
    Keywords: 雙壟斷市場;再製造;remanufacturing;duopoly;monopoly;recycle number
    Date: 2012-01-20
    Issue Date: 2012-06-15 20:33:50 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來的節約能源話題帶來的影響就是讓企業可思考更多關於環保,由於這個議題越來越被重視,而電子垃圾的處理以及回收也亦趨重要。也因為回收再製產品會具有高營利,並且引起所多環境效應,包括減少能源消耗跟減少廢棄物。 本篇研究是延伸Ferre rand Swaminathan(2006)製造商為壟斷者及在競爭市場中有競爭者存在的多期回收模式。研究單一製造商,在第一期間去生產新產品,並在之後期間使用回收機制方式以提供再製品及新產品去滿足顧客的需求。本文研究是如何決定產品回收次數,使製造商可得利潤最佳化。判定產品回收次數,是將每期再製造節省成本門檻值與再製造節省成本作於比較,再決定再製造的回收次數。再製造節省成本門檻值代表製造商採用回收機制是否有利潤。下一步,重點將把注意力集中在雙寡頭壟斷的環境下,競爭者可攔截製造商的產品做回收再製造銷售,探討兩者在市場下競爭關係。當發現再製造產品是非常有利可圖,製造商可能會放棄在第一期銷售價格,進行降低價格來增加銷售數量,以備在未來期間可回收製成再製品數量眾多。在競爭加劇的威脅中,製造商更可能完全利用所有可用回收產品,在市場上提供較低的再製造產品價格。We interest a firm that makes new products in the first period and uses returned cores to offer remanufactured products and new products in future periods. We use the number of remanufactured cycling products as thresholds. We introduce the monopoly environment in multi period scenarios to identify thresholds in remanufacturing operations. Next, we focus on the duopoly environment. An independent operator might intercept cores of products made by the original equipment manufacturer to sell remanufactured products in future periods. We describe the production quantities associated with self-selection and research the effect of various parameters in the Nash equilibrium. In the results, we find that if remanufacturing is very benefit, the original-equipment manufacturer might give up some of the first-period margin by lowering the price. And that, they selling additional units to raise the number of cores available for remanufacturing in future periods. In the further, when the threat of competition rises, the manufacturer is approximately to completely use all available cores and offering the remanufactured products at a lower price.
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML630View/Open


    All items in NCUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明