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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/51663


    Title: Equilibrium analysis and Pareto improvement of a supply chain under revenue sharing contract with consignment and slotting allowances
    Authors: Chen,JM;Cheng,HL;Chien,MC
    Contributors: 工業管理研究所
    Keywords: VIDEO RENTAL INDUSTRY;CHANNEL PERFORMANCE;COORDINATION;COMPETITION;PRODUCT;PRICE;FEES
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-03-27 19:02:05 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: 國立中央大學
    Abstract: Revenue sharing contract with consignment is prevalent in internet commerce, video rental, vending machine, and used-book merchandising. Under such a contract, the study models the decision-making of a supply channel with one manufacturer and one retailer as a Stackelberg game. The retailer, acting as the leader, offers the manufacturer a revenue sharing contract, which specifies the percentage allocation of revenue between her and the manufacturer. The manufacturer chooses a retail price as a response. The study conducts equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized channel settings with and without cooperation. The study reveals that the profit loss due to non-cooperative decentralization is significant, and it tends to have a consistent bias that is setting higher retail price by the manufacturer and higher revenue-sharing percentage by the retailer. Notably, the loss is increasing in the price elasticity of demand and decreasing in the retailer's cost-share. In other words, the cooperative decentralization will generate more profit than that of the non-cooperative if the retailer's cost-share is small and/or the elasticity is high. In addition, a profit-sharing scheme through slotting allowance is proposed to achieve perfect coordination, which leads to Pareto improvements among channel participants.
    Relation: AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
    Appears in Collections:[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] journal & Dissertation

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