多通路競爭與營收分享合約下之最佳訂價與營收分享決策Optimal; pricing and sharing under dual-channel competition and revenue sharing contract

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Title:	多通路競爭與營收分享合約下之最佳訂價與營收分享決策Optimal;pricing and sharing under dual-channel competition and revenue sharing contract
Authors:	何宗璘;Zong-lin He
Contributors:	工業管理研究所
Keywords:	定價;營收分享;價格競爭;多通路競爭;price competition;dual-channel competition;pricing;revenue sharing
Date:	2010-06-22
Issue Date:	2010-12-08 14:44:55 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學
Abstract:	相較於過去，現今的產銷環境顯得更為複雜：不論實體或虛擬通路都較過去更為多元；且產品的可替代性增加，進而使得通路間競爭越演越烈。依經濟學的觀點而言，若採取削價方式競爭，則只會帶來兩敗俱傷的結果。削價競爭於目前的經濟環境中已不再是長久之計，因此通路協調重要性日漸增長。本篇研究主要為延伸Ingene and Parry (1998) 的單一製造商和兩個零售商之通路結構。製造商與其中一個零售商簽訂營收分享契約，因此製造商與該零售商為合作關係。兩個零售商彼此為價格競爭對手，其競爭結果反應於需求函數上。本文的探討過程主要分成兩個階段：第一階段為在固定營收分享比例以及批發價格的前提下，兩個彼此價格競爭的零售商如何決定最佳零售價格，使得各自利潤函數最大化；第二階段則探討製造商與具營收分享機制之零售商該如何制訂批發價格以及營收分享比例，以之極大化製造商與具營收分享機制之零售商的獲利。本研究結果顯示，具營收分享機制之零售商的批發價格必定低於無營收分享機制之零售商的批發價格；且具營收分享機制之零售商的零售價格必定低於無營收分享機制之零售商的零售價格。Environment today is more complex than before: not only physical but also virtual channel. Besides, the increased product substitutability cause the competition between channels increased. In economics, if competition with price-cutting, it will cause destruction to both sides. In this research, we use the channel structure by Ingene and Parry (1998). This channel structure is consisted of one manufacture and two price competitive retailers. And one of the retailers has revenue sharing contract with manufacture. This research divides into two phase. The phase one discusses the optimal retail prices given wholesale prices and revenue sharing. The phase two continues using the result of phase one, and discusses the optimal wholesale prices and revenue sharing. We found that the retail price in the retailer which doesn’t have a revenue sharing contract with the manufacture is higher than the retail price in the retailer which has a revenue sharing contract with the manufacture. And the whoesle price in the retailer which doesn’t have a revenue sharing contract with the manufacture is higher than the retail price in the retailer which has a revenue sharing contract with the manufacture.
Appears in Collections:	[工業管理研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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