STRUCTURE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics > journal & Dissertation > Item 987654321/29564

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/29564

Title:	STRUCTURE REGULATION, PRICE STRUCTURE, CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION AND MARGINAL COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS
Authors:	Chang,MC;Peng,HP
Contributors:	產業經濟研究所
Keywords:	DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY;PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY;QUANTITY COMPETITION;OPTIMAL TAXATION;ENTRY BARRIERS;WELFARE;MARKETS;GOODS;TELECOMMUNICATIONS;COMPATIBILITY
Date:	2009
Issue Date:	2010-06-29 20:31:23 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	中央大學
Abstract:	In this paper we study the social desirability of the structure regulation which transforms a single multi-product monopoly into an oligopoly where the industry produces differentiated complementary goods. In particular, we pay special attention to the cross-subsidization which will be eliminated by the structure regulation. It is established that if horizontal externalities between the goods are not too strong, then the monopoly has a socially optimal price structure. In contrast, the oligopoly always distorts the price structure. We also demonstrate that the monopoly will cross-subsidize a product if and only if this product has a relatively low absolute advantage.
Relation:	MANCHESTER SCHOOL
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Industrial Economics] journal & Dissertation

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