考量多通路競爭下之定價與訂購量聯合決策; Optimal pricing and order quantity under dual-channel with competition

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題名:	考量多通路競爭下之定價與訂購量聯合決策;Optimal pricing and order quantity under dual-channel with competition
作者:	林忠毅;Chung-I Lin
貢獻者:	工業管理研究所
關鍵詞:	價格模型;品牌競爭;自有品牌;收費會員制;賽局模型;membership fee;store brand;game theory;price competition;brand competiton
日期:	2009-06-29
上傳時間:	2009-09-22 14:20:01 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學圖書館
摘要:	臺灣量販業自1989年發展至今已有20年的歷史，目前台灣量販店已趨向成熟期且趨近飽和，過去最大的競爭優勢「低價策略」，已成了量販店經營的基本條件。因此量販店業者在汰弱存強的競爭環境中欲求永續經營，紛紛提出建立自有品牌以及收取會員費等策略，以培養顧客忠誠度並鞏固其市場佔有率。本研究是在考量多通路競爭下探討零售商的競爭行為，分成收費會員制與免費會員制零售商競爭以及自有品牌和全國性品牌的競爭兩大部分。第一部份是探討收費會員制與免費會員制零售商競爭。以價格競爭確定性需求函數在單一製造商對兩個零售商的兩階層產銷通路結構中，在假設免費會員制量販店商品定價必高於收費會員制量販店商品定價下，以零售商整體利潤最大化為目標，分別對免費會員制量販店和收費會員制量販店的商品定價和訂購量做分析、比較。第二部份是探討自有品牌和全國性品牌的競爭。以價格競爭確定性需求函數在二個製造商對單一零售商的兩階層產銷通路結構中，研究自有品牌和全國性品牌的競爭。並且在營收分享的契約下探討自有品牌和全國性品牌商品最佳的定價策略以及營收分享比例。本研究結果顯示收費會員制零售商定價必低於免費會員制零售商定價，在零售商自有品牌與全國性品牌競爭下，整合式通路的總利潤大於分散式通路的總利潤。且全國性品牌定價高於自有品牌定價，只有在自有品牌價格交叉彈性極大時例外。 Since 1989, warehouse store has developed in Taiwan for 20 years. There are 130 warehouse stores in Taiwan now. The past main competitive advantage 「Low Price」 has became the basic condition for warehouse store operating. Therefore, most of the warehouse stores have established their own store brand or charged warehouse club fee to improve customer’s loyalty and consolidating marketing sharing rate. This research considers optimal pricing and order quantity under dual-channel. It divides into two parts which include retailer competition and brand competition. Part one discusses the competition between two retailers. One charges club fee and the other doesn’t charge club fee. The channel includes one manufacture and two retailers on certainty demand. We assume that the product price in the retailer which doesn’t charge club fee is higher than the product price in the retailer which charges club fee. Then we a compare the optimal price and order quantity between two retailers. Part two discusses brand competition. The channel includes two manufactures and one retailer on certainty demand. We try to decide the optimal price and optimal revenue sharing rate under revenue sharing contract. We found that the product price in the retailer which doesn’t charge club fee is higher than the product price in the retailer which charges club fee. Under brand competition, the total profit of centralized channel is higher than the total profit of decentralized channel. National brand’s price is higher than store brand’s price, which only excepts when the store brand’s Cross-Price Elasticity is very high.
顯示於類別:	[工業管理研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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