供應商考慮零售商為下滑風險之協調供應鏈; Coordination of Supply chain with consideration of retailer the down-side risk

NCUIR > School of Management at National Central University > Graduate Institute of Industrial Management > Electronic Thesis & Dissertation > Item 987654321/11329

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Title:	供應商考慮零售商為下滑風險之協調供應鏈;Coordination of Supply chain with consideration of retailer the down-side risk
Authors:	彭成右;Cheng-yu Peng
Contributors:	工業管理研究所
Keywords:	下滑風險;批發價合約;協調供應鏈;down-side risk;wholesale price contract;coordination supply chain
Date:	2008-06-17
Issue Date:	2009-09-22 14:19:08 (UTC+8)
Publisher:	國立中央大學圖書館
Abstract:	協調供應鏈管理的問題已經被廣泛的討論與應用，在許多的文獻中供應鏈中的成員都是假設其為風險中立，在實際的供應鏈裡，供應商與零售商都有不同的風險偏好，因此我們結合在推式系統中考慮供應鏈成員風險喜好的報童模式。在推式的合約裡，零售商必須預測需求且在銷售季節前向供應商訂貨，因此零售商必須承擔供應鏈中的存貨風險，在本研究中發現，當零售商考慮下滑風險時，向供應商的訂貨數量會減少，進而造成整體供應鏈的利益損失，所以本研究中討論了兩種情況，情境一為供應商不知道零售商存在著下滑風險；情境二為供應商考慮到零售商存在著下滑風險，我們想知道這兩種情況是否會會影響訂購數量，還有零售上存在下滑風險時和整體供應鏈的利潤的關係，進而提出改善的方法。在本研究中發現，情況一的最佳訂購數量會小於零售商為風險中立時的最佳定量，且情況二的最佳訂購量又會小於情況一的最佳訂購量，因此得知零售商存在著下滑風險時的確會造成整體供應鏈利潤的損失，最後提出買回的合約去協調供應鏈，協調供應鏈後使用合約的最佳訂購量會大於情況二的最佳訂購量，並達到柏拉圖改善。 The supply chain management has been discussed so far, most of them are considered the agents in the supply chain are risk neutral. In the real world, the supplier and retailer may have different attitudes toward risk. For this reason, we incorporate a push contract and the agents have risk preference into the newsvendor model. In a push contract, the retailer orders the entire supply before the selling season and bears all of the supply chain’s inventory risk. We analyze the (newsvendor) model by considering the retailer’s attitude toward risk, which is risk neutrality or has down-side risk. If the retailer has down-side risk, we further analyze two cases. In Case 1, the supplier makes a decision without knowing the retailer’s risk preference, and in Case 2, we consider the opposite situation that the supplier knows the retailer’s risk attitude and makes the corresponding decision. We want to realize the relationship between the retailer’s optimal order quantities in Case 1 and the ones in Case 2. We find out that the retailer’s optimal order quantity in Case 1 is smaller than the optimal order quantity as the retailer is risk neutral but bigger than the optimal order quantity in Case 2. Furthermore, the supplier facing a down-side risk retailer gets more profit if he knows the retailer’s risk preference. Moreover we provide the Buy-back contract to coordinate the supply chain to get the more profit in these situations.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute of Industrial Management] Electronic Thesis & Dissertation

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