在數量折扣及信用期下的通路協調決策; Channel Coordination under the Condition of Quantity Discounts with Credit Period Policy

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题名:	在數量折扣及信用期下的通路協調決策;Channel Coordination under the Condition of Quantity Discounts with Credit Period Policy
作者:	陳家麟;Chia-Lin Chen
贡献者:	工業管理研究所
关键词:	通路合作;數量折扣;信用期;Credit period;Quantity discount;Channel coordination
日期:	2005-06-30
上传时间:	2009-09-22 14:14:25 (UTC+8)
出版者:	國立中央大學圖書館
摘要:	本研究從通路合作的角度來探討當供應商同時提供數量折扣與信用期兩項機制給零售商時的通路協商問題。其環境假設為只有單一賣方提供單一產品給予單一買方的三層式架構，且產品具有價格敏感性。本文分別從買賣雙方的資金機會成本與銀行利息兩個層面來加以探討，並假設其利息收入與支出的比率相同。本研究以求得上述問題之買賣雙方的最佳決策以達成通路合作為目標，並針對買賣雙方處於獨立決策以及聯合決策等模式下發展出一些演算法以求取買方的最佳訂購及訂價決策。本文指出當買賣雙方處於獨立作決策的情形下，唯有當買方同意訂購至一定數量的產品且得已最大化賣方獲利時，賣方才有意願同時提供數量折扣及信用期給買方；而本文也指出通路獲利的最大化可藉由買賣雙方透過數量折扣與信用期兩個機制所作的通路聯合決策來加以達成，且買賣雙方透過通路合作所產生的通路聯合利潤必大於買賣雙方在各自作單獨決策時所產生的通路聯合利潤。另外，本文也指出當我們將銀行利息納入考量時，同時提供數量折扣與信用期兩項機制所獲得的通路聯合獲利必高於單一提供其任一機制時所獲得的通路聯合獲利。根據Nash (1950)所提出的理論，本文指出最佳的信用期應設定於當買賣雙方具有相同的議價能力時，其獲利最高。最後，本研究透過數學實驗與敏感度分析來探討分別針對買賣雙方處於獨立決策以及聯合決策等模式下，同時提供數量折扣與信用期兩個機制時對於買賣雙方以及整體通路所產生的獲利影響。 This research focuses on the problem of channel coordination under the condition of the supplier who simultaneously offers the quantity discounts scheme and the credit period policy to the retailer. Market structure involves only one single supplier who sells one item to a single retailer, demand of the product is presented as a downward slopping function of retail price. The problem is discussed from the perspective of the capital opportunity cost and bank interest respectively. Yearly unit interest pay rate and yearly unit interest gain rate are assumed to be the same in this study. The objective of this research is to determine the optimal policies of both parties to achieve channel coordination under the situations described above. Algorithms are developed to determine the optimal pricing and ordering policies under non-cooperative and cooperative relationships between both parties. We demonstrate that under non-cooperative relationship of both parties, the supplier only has the incentive to offer these mechanisms if the retailer orders up to a certain quantity that maximizes the supplier’s annual net profit. As for the situation when both parties are cooperated, channel coordination can be achieved by simultaneously applying the quantity discounts scheme and the credit period policy, and joint annual net profit under cooperative relationship is always higher than the joint annual net profit under unilateral decisions made by each party. We also demonstrate that when bank interest is in consideration, joint channel profit is higher under simultaneously applying the quantity discounts scheme and the credit period policy than applying either of them independently. According to Nash (1950), we illustrate that optimal credit period should be determined under the condition when both the supplier and retailer have the same bargaining power. Finally, numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses are applied to discuss the effectiveness of using both the quantity discounts and credit period as the mechanism to achieve channel coordination under non-cooperative and cooperative relationships between both parties.
显示于类别:	[工業管理研究所 ] 博碩士論文

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