流行性商品具有高度需求不確定性、銷售時間短暫和製造前置時間長等銷售特性，因此，製造商普遍採行退貨政策或是其他機制，透過共同分攤銷售風險之方式，誘使零售商提高產品訂購數量，同時鼓勵零售商增加銷售，以減少退貨機會，促使雙方牟利，欲達成產銷協調之目標。本研究在二階層通路結構中，針對流行性商品，考慮價格對於需求之影響，架構Stacklberg 賽局理論之單期模型，主要探討製造商如何運用退貨政策與獎勵機制的結合，影響零售商之訂購與定價決策，同時刺激零售商大量訂購、積極銷售，謀求通路利潤之最大化，達到通路整合之目的。 Fashion goods are characterized with demand uncertainty, a short selling season and long manufacturing lead time. Therefore, the manufacturer usually offers return and rebate polices to encourage the retailer to stock more inventory. Under the mechanism, the channel will achieve coordination. This paper we consider the single period inventory model under price-dependent demand. We adopt the Stacklberg equilibrium to decide the ordering and pricing problems in the channel. Our objective is to build the design of supply contract policy of return and rebate polices that maximum the channel profit and achieve channel coodination.
